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Small Business Lending 
and Bank Profitability
James Kolari 
Robert Berney 
Charles Ou
In theory commercial banks exist to resolve asymmetric information problems in 
credit markets. Because small business firms have much greater information 
problems than large firms,, it is not surprising that they depend almost entirely on 
banks for external finance needs. Unfortunately, little is known either in academic 
literature or banking practice about the profitability of small business credit (and 
related information) services. The present study employs recently available business 
loan size information from the Call Reports for all insured U.S. commercial banks in 
1994 and 1995 to examine the relationship between bank profits and small business 
credit. Regression analyses are conducted using the rate of return on assets and 
business loans less than $250,000, in addition to a number of variables that proxy 
various dimensions of risk that potentially could influence this relationship. Due to 
the fact that small and large banks differ considerably in their lending activities, 
separate analyses are conducted for five asset size groups. In brief, we find that, 
while small business loans likely have a negligible effect the profits of large banks, 
they tend to increase the profitability of small banks over time, holding constant 
various bank risk characteristics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Theory suggests that asymmetric information is a major problem in the 
provision of credit by lenders (e.g., see Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977; 
Campbell & Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984).^ In this regard, Fama (1985) 
argues that commercial banks are unique financial intermediaries because they 
overcome information deficiencies by collecting so-called inside (or otherwise 
private) information from the firm’s managers and principals. Banks have a
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fiduciary responsibility to keep this information private, such that leaks would 
cause a loss in their reputational capital and future public trust.
Prowse (1996) has observed that the asymmetric information problem is 
particularly acute in the case of small firms. In contrast to most large firms, 
small firms typically do not have long credit histories, well-documented 
relationships with suppliers and buyers, and publicly-held stock that provide a 
wealth of information about the firm to investors. Not surprisingly, and 
consistent with the aforementioned theoretical framework, survey information 
recently gathered by the Federal Reserve and the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. 
Small Business Administration^ indicates that the dominant instimtional 
provider of credit for small firms is the commercial bank. Indeed, about 87 
percent of small firms with 1 0 0  to 500 employees utilized bank credit to 
supplement their financing needs.
While banks are specialized lenders in the sense of producing and managing 
inside information, they will only provide small business credit to the extent that 
it is perceived to be a profitable enterprise. Unfortunately, little or no 
information is available either in the banking literature or among bankers 
themselves on the profitablity of small business lending. This shortfall has 
serious implications from a public policy perspective. Small firms are a major 
source of national employment, innovation, and economic growth in the U.S. 
(e.g., the latest available data from the Census reported that firms with 1-4 
employees added 565,000 net new jobs in the period 1990-1992, while the 
economy as a whole lost 643,000 jobs). If there are misconceptions among 
bankers and others about the profitability and risks of small business loans, 
misallocation of credit in the financial system could result in lowered national 
productivity and standards of living.^
In June 1993 Congress required banks for the first time to include in their 
Call Reports schedule RC-C entitled “Loans to Small Businesses and Small 
Farms.” Cross-sectional information on different categories of small 
commercial and industrial and commercial real estate loans for all insured U.S. 
banks is contained in this schedule."  ^This new data source has been employed in 
a number of recent studies [viz., Berger and Udell (1995), Keeton (1995) Peek 
and Rosengren (1995), and Whalen (1995)] that focus on how bank structure 
(i.e., size, multi-office branching, multi-bank holding companies, and 
acquisitions and mergers) affects smaU business lending behavior. However, no 
research has directly addressed the issue of whether or not small business 
lending (and related information production) is profitable for commercial banks, 
holding various risks constant that could potential influence this relationship.^
The present study seeks to fill this gap in banking literature and practice by 
reporting empirical evidence on the relationship between bank profit and small 
business credit, holding constant a number of risk variables. Based on 1994 and
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1995 Call Report data for all insured U.S. commercial banks, our regression 
analyses indicate that small business loans tend to have a beneficial effect on 
small banks’ profitability over time. More specifically, in 1994 no signficant 
relationship was found, but this result was overturned in 1995 by a highly 
signficant positive association between bank profit and small business lending 
for banks with assets less than $500 million. One exception to these findings is 
that in 1995 banks with total assets in the range of $500 miUion to $3 billion 
experienced lower profits as small business lending increased. Because small 
business lending comprises a small proportion of assets for these larger banks, it 
is likely that this result was not economically meaningful. Alternatively, further 
study is needed to ascertain the reasons for this negative relationship and its 
implications to large banks’ credit flows to the small business sector.
The next section describes our methodology and is followed by the 
empirical results section. The last section gives the conclusions and imphcations 
of the study.
METHODOLOGY
To examine the relationship between bank profitability and small business 
lending it is necessary to hold constant differences between banks’ on- and off- 
balance sheet risk profiles, market concentration, and size. For this reason we 
employ an OLS multivariate regression model with numerous control variables. 
Table 1 defines the dependent and independent variables in the model.^
The dependent variable is the rate of return on assets (ROA), which is the 
most commonly used measure of profit in the banking industry. ROA is defined
Table 1 
Definitions of Variables
Variables Definitions
Profitability:
ROA Rate of return on assets, or net income after taxes to total assets 
Risk Variables:
LOSS Loan and lease losses minus recoveries to total assets
TIERl Tier 1 (core) capital, or total equity to total assets
OFFBAL Total off-balance sheet activities to total assets
SECURITIES Total securities to total assets
PURCHASED Purchased funds, or large time deposits plus other borrowed money to total 
assets
ASSETS Total assets
HHI Herfindahl index
SMALLBUS Small business loans (commercial and industrial loans and commercial real 
estate loans under $250,000) to total assets
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as net income after taxes, including gains and losses on securities and other 
extraordinary items, divided by total assets.^ In theory the marginal profitability 
of different products and services offered by banks should be similar after 
adjusting for risk and other bank characteristics. If they were not similar, the 
most profitable products and services would be expanded until their marginal 
profit rates dropped to a level competitive with other financial services. In this 
regard there should be no difference in return between small business loans and 
other asset types for a given bank after adjusting for differences in risk. Thus, 
theory is consistent with the null hypothesis that there is no difference in profits 
as measured by ROA among banks with varying levels of small business 
lending.^
A number of other independent variables shown in Table 2 are included in 
the regression models to adjust for bank characteristics that could influence the 
relationship between ROA and small business lending. For example, loan and 
lease losses net of recoveries to total assets (LOSS)^ is the most often cited 
indicator of bank risk. Most banks generate the lion’s share of their earnings in 
the loan portfolio; therefore, controlling credit risk is critical to survival and 
profitabihty.
Another control variable is total equity capital to total assets (TIER 1), 
referred to as core or Tier 1 capital by regulators. This ratio represents the 
ownership stake of shareholders in the bank. It is well known that this 
capitalization ratio tends to decrease with bank size, which enables larger banks 
to have lower ROAs but still offer shareholders a comparable rate of return on 
equity (e.g., see Samolyk 1994). To adjust for this possibility, we include TIERl 
to hold constant bank capitalization in examining the relationship between small 
business lending and ROA.^^
Over the last decade, the ratio of off-balance sheet activities to total assets 
(OFFBAL) has dramatically increased in the banking industry, especially among 
multi-billion dollar banks. Many banks provide various hedging services to 
clients (e.g., futures and options trading in addition to swap arrangements). More 
commonly, banks offer loan commitments that firms can later utilize for 
financing project needs over time. These off-balance sheet services and others 
enable banks to earn service revenue and enhance their relationships with 
clients. However, while they help reduce clients’ risks, they increase the ojf- 
balance sheet risk exposure of the bank. For example, loan commitments tend to 
increase liquidity demands, and hedging services in derivatives are normally 
exposed to some degree of market risk.
The next variable is inversely related to risk—namely, the ratio of total 
securities to total assets (SECURITIES). By definition, increasing the securities 
ratio decreases the ratio of total loans to assets and thereby reduces bank 
liquidity risk (i.e., securities act as a secondary reserve for meeting liquidity
4 ENTREPRENEURIAL AND SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 5(1) 1996
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needs of banks). Securities generally do not earn rates of interest as high as 
loans, as banks normally purchase government and investment grade money and 
capital market debt instruments. However, theory suggests that on a risk- 
adjusted basis, their marginal rate of return should be the same.
The extent to which banks use purchased funds as a proportion of total 
assets (PURCHASED) is another measure of risk. Unlike core deposits with 
lower interest costs and higher noninterest costs (associated with added labor 
and record keeping services), purchased funds bear market interest rates and, 
thus, have higher and more volatile interest costs than core deposits. 
Additionally, they are more volatile in the sense that outflows of funds can occur 
rapidly if higher market rates can be obtained elsewhere. Deregulation of interest 
rates on deposits has increased the use of purchased funds by banks and, 
consequently, \hs\x funding risk.
We also include measures of bank size and market structure (or market risk). 
While we do divide our sample banks into subsamples using five asset size 
groupings (to be discussed shortly) and run separate regression analyses for each 
subsample, this cross-sectional approach to adjusting for size differences is 
arbitrary and may not fully adjust for size effects. For this reason we included 
total domestic assets (ASSETS) in the regression models. Market structure is 
proxied by the well-known Herfindahl index (HHI), which is the sum of squared 
ratios of the total assets of the ith bank to the aggregate total assets of all banks 
in the SMS A for urban areas or county for other areas. The structure-conduct- 
performance (SCP) paradigm^^ implies that, as concentration in local bank 
markets increases (i.e., higher HHI), profit rates can be expected to increase due 
to diminished competition.
Lastly, and most important to the present study, small business credit is 
calculated as the ratio of small commercial and industrial and conmiercial real 
estate loans (SMALLBUS) to total assets. The Call Report breaks down small 
business loans down into three size categories: less than $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 , $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  to 
$250,000, and $250,000 to $1 miUion. Loans less $100,000 would ignore all but 
the very smallest firms, and loans in the $250,000 to $ 1  million range would 
contain many loans to large firms. Thus, we opted to collapse two categories to 
obtain all business loans less than $250,000, thereby capturing the majority of 
small business loans in the U.S. banking industry.^^
Table 2 gives the means and standard deviations of the variables in 1994 and 
1995. Results are given for all banks, as well as five arbitrary asset size 
groupings of banks: <$100 million (smallest), $100-$300 miUion (small), $300- 
$500 million (medium), $500 million-$3 billion (medium large), and > $3 
biUion (large). As we will see, the average values of the variables differ 
considerably across bank size groups.
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Table 2 shows that the rate of return on assets (ROA) gradually increases 
from a range of 0.56-0.57 percent for the smallest banks (with less than $100 
million in assets) to 0.63-0.67 percent for large banks (with more than $3 
billion in assets). As bank asset size increases, per dollar of assets, loan and 
lease losses net of recoveries (LOSS) and purchased funds (PURCHASED) 
increase, while equity capital (TIERl) and securities holdings (SECURITIES) 
decrease. These differences do not necessarily mean that larger banks have 
higher failure risk than smaller banks. Larger banks likely have considerable 
geographic and product diversification that reduces their exposure to regional 
and product specific risks and, in turn, enables them to reduce their equity 
capital. Additionally, relative to smaller banks, they enjoy greater access to 
market fimds, probably reap economies of scale in certain operations, and 
potentially have the advantage of market power. On the other hand, smaller 
banks tend to benefit from a more stable customer base, greater ability to 
adapt quickly to changing market demands, and cooperative relationships with 
larger banks that help overcome some of their disadvantages vis-a-vis larger 
banks.
Off-balance sheet exposure (OFFBAL) of banks greatly differed across size 
groups. In 1994 and 1995 the smallest and smaller groups of banks had ratios in 
the range of 7-13 percent compared to 59-835 percent for medium large and 
large banks. This large difference implies that multi-billion dollar banks are 
unique and not comparable to the other groups.
Also notice that mean HHIs tend to decrease with bank asset size. This trend 
suggests that small banks operate in relatively more concentrated local bank 
markets than large banks (i.e., most small banks exist outside of urban SMSAs 
in which competition for bank services is likely to be less intense than 
otherwise).
Finally, Table 2 shows that small banks have much larger exposures to 
small business credit than large banks. The smallest and small bank groups 
had mean ratios of small loans to total assets in the range of 10-13 percent. 
Small business credit drops off markedly as bank size increases further, with 
mean ratios of 5-6 percent for medium large banks and 2-3 percent for large 
banks. While these means clearly indicate that smaller banks are more active 
small business lenders than larger banks, some caution is needed in their 
interpretation. Some large banks have considerable dollar volumes of small 
business loans, but as a proportion of total assets, their exposure is relatively 
small.
It is clear that banks differ considerably in their activities, risk exposures, 
and market conditions as size changes. For these reasons, as already mentioned, 
we run separate regressions for each of the bank size groups in Table 2.
Small Business Lending 7
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II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS^^
Tables 3 and 4 report the multiple regression results using ROA as the 
dependent variable for 1994 and 1995, respectively. The overall F statistics are 
all significant at the 0 . 0 1  level, and the adjusted values are in the range of 
13-28 percent in 1994 and 7-44 percent in 1995. These statistics indicate that 
there is weak to moderate goodness of fit in these regression models. Also notice 
that all of the independent variables are statistically significant in at least one of 
the regression models in both 1994 and 1995.
Concerning the risk control variables, ROA was positively related to capital 
(TIERl) and purchased funds (PURCHASED)—that is, holding other bank 
characteristics constant, profitability is higher among banks with higher equity 
capitalization^^ and lower costs of funding assets, respectively. The significant 
regression coefficients for off-balance sheet activities (OFFBAL) are also 
positive (with one exception) and, consequently, imply that these activities tend 
to increase profits, holding other variables constant. Moreover, as expected, 
ROA was negatively related to loan and lease losses (LOSS) and securities 
holdings (SECURITIES) (i.e., securities tend to have lower risks and returns 
than loans). Relevant to market structure, HHI and ASSETS were positively 
related to ROA when they were significant in the regression models, which is 
consistent with the SCP paradigm.
Turning to the small business credit results, which are our primary interest. 
Table 3 shows that SMALLBUS is insignificant for all size groups in 1994. 
Notice that, for smaller banks under $500 million in assets, the signs of the 
regression coefficients are positive, while the signs are negative for larger banks 
over $500 milUon in assets. Table 4 reveals a comparable pattern of coefficient 
signs for SMALLBUS across size groups based on 1995 data. However, for the 
first three asset size groups, SMALLBUS now is significant and positively 
related to ROA—that is, holding the control variables constant, smaller banks 
increased their profitability by expanding their small business lending activity. 
Also significant is the negative coefficient for medium large banks in the $500 
million to $3 billion asset size range. While this relationship is statistically 
significant, because larger banks devote a relatively low percentage of assets to 
small business loans (see Table 2), it is reasonable to believe that these banks’ 
profitability was not significantly lowered from an economic standpoint.
Table 5 provides the correlation coefficients between the independent 
variables using all banks in the samples. The highest correlation coefficients in 
both 1994 and 1995 are between TIERl and PURCHASED (i.e., -0.39 in 1994 
and -0.41 in 1995) and SECURITIES and SMALLBUS (i.e., 0.38 in 1994 and
0.36 in 1995). As shown in Table 2, these results no doubt are related to bank 
size, which is held constant in the regression models. More importantly, all other
10 ENTREPRENEURIAL AND SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 5(1) 1996
Small Business Lending 11
1-H
'§
§
0Q
I
s
a
(/5
gfl
(U
01)
>
flI
fHH
,o
f l
2
oU
Co
0 \
o
o
O O CMO  O  -H 
^  p d
^cp
8 2 S n
^ d d d
I
o CO r- in 00 
o —' o o cn 
-h’ d  d  d  d
»n On ^  <N ra O ^ cn o O 
-h' d  d  d  d  d
oq
8
VO Os ^  cn
o ^ cn ^ o od> cS d> <6 d)
o VO ^ r-O O O - H
1-h' d  c ? ?
o o 
d  d
8  S  S  2
- o o o
O  CN r-H m  VO
o ^ ^ o cn 
d  d  d  d
8 S S S S S
-H d  d  d  d  d
o VO T-* m O O ^ ^ -H o o
-h' d  d  d  d  d  d
o o v o mo N^ c s r -O ^ O - h O O O O
^ d d d d d d d
correlation coefficients are relatively small. We infer from these findings that the 
independent variables proxy different bank risk characteristics and that 
multicollinearity is likely not a source of bias in the estimation of the regression 
parameters.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The main conclusion to be drawn from the multivariate findings is that, at least 
over time, small business loans tend to boost bank profitability among small 
banks after holding constant different bank characteristics. A positive and 
significant relationship between small business lending and the rate of return on 
assets was found in 1995 for all three groupings of small banks with less than 
$500 million in assets. In 1994 this relationship was positive but insignificant for 
smaller banks. By contrast, small business lending activity was negatively 
related to profit rates for larger banks in 1994 and 1995 and, in the latter year, 
the relationship was significant in banks with $500 million to $3 billion in total 
assets. One interpretation of the negative finding in 1995 is that a relatively low 
proportion of assets is devoted to small business lending in larger banks, such 
that it was not economically significant in terms of reducing their profitability. 
Alternatively, additional research is needed to examine this issue in greater 
detail, especially in light of the public policy implications to funding the small 
business sector and associated national productivity.
As a final note, our results represent the first available evidence on this issue 
and are preliminary in the sense that they depend on only two years of data. As 
additional data is compiled in forthcoming years, further evidence will enhance 
our understanding of how small business lending affects bank profit and risk. In 
this regard, a relevant current trend that could alter some of our results is the 
growing use of credit scoring models in small business lending by large banks. 
Relatedly, by increasing standardization in the loan process, securitization of 
small business loans may be possible. Of course, given our empirical results, a 
major motivation for these changes among larger banks is that the profitability 
of small business loans could be increased.
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NOTES
1. Asymmetric information arises when there are incentives for owners or managers of firms to 
withhold valuable information from investors.
2. The National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) contains responses from about
5,300 firms.
3. This possibility is not remote due to the fact that small firms have numerous disadvantages
relative to large firms. Small firms are less well diversified, have less access to capital and
liquidity, and have more limited management resources than large firms. Such disadvantages
could easily discourage banks from making small business loans in the absence of profit
potential information.
4. In this initial year there were substantial errors that make analyses based on this early data
suspect; however, the subsequent mid-year 1994 and 1995 updates are considered by federal
regulators to be accurate.
5. Numerous studies have examined the financial condition of small banks relative to large
banks and, therefore, make indirect inferences concerning the effects of small business
lending on bank performance. For example, see Benston (1985), Fant (1985), Fraser and
Kolari (1985), Brunner and English (1993), Moore and Couch (1994), and Harvey (1995).
6. Initial analyses of the entire population of insured U.S. banks suggested that there is a unique
subgroup of banks on the Call Report tapes that have extraordinary off-balance sheet
activities. Inspection of the data revealed that these banks tended to make no business loans.
Correspondence with this group indicated that most of these banks were wholly-owned
subsidiaries of large banks with special charters that do not allow them to make commercial
and industrial loans (for example). To reduce this potential bias in the data, we dropped
banks with no commercial loans. The final samples contained 10,542 and 9,991 U.S. insured
commercial banks in 1994 and 1995, respectively. These samples necessarily include
multiple banks within the same multibank holding company (MBHC). As such, our analyses
presume that the data for each bank reflect the operations of an individual bank operating as 
an independent entity.
7. We also conducted analyses using other measures of bank profitability, including the net
interest margin, the net interest margin adjusted for loan losses, and the rate of return on
equity. In general, the results were similar to those reported here for the rate of return on
assets.
8. In practice, we can only observe the average return on different asset types. That is, ROA
reflects revenues and expenses over a period of time (i.e., one-half year in the present case),
as opposed to a moment in time.
9. LOSS measures total charge-offs and recoveries on all loans and leases, as opposed to only
commercial loan losses. The Call Reports do provide detail on commercial and industrial
loan losses, but no disaggregated data for commercial real estate losses is available to
develop a measure that closely coincides with business lending as defined by our small
business lending variable.
10. Further justification for including TIERl is that higher bank capitalization may well reduce
risk of failure. According to Berger (1994), higher capital tends to alter the portfolio
decisions of banks, which can alter the risk and return profiles of both on- and off-balance 
sheet activities. Also, he notes that higher capital could lower the cost of uninsured debt and 
influence other operating costs that affect bank profitability.
11. Large banks have far more off-balance sheet activities than small banks, due in large part to
scale economies required in many such activities, including proprietary mutual funds, 
mortgage servicing operations, financial standby letters of credit, and derivative contracts. 
Some small banks do participate in asset securitization and fiduciary activities that would not 
appear on their balance sheet.
12. See Gilbert (1984) for an excellent review of this literature, in addition to Hannan (1991).
13. A weakness in this definition of small business lending is that loan size does not necessarily
coincide perfectly with firm size. Also, many small business firms use credit cards, which
fall under consumer loans on the Call Reports, for various working capital needs.
Apparently, despite these drawbacks. Congress believed that the data was a reasonable proxy
for small business lending.
14. Univariate analyses of the variables, with emphasis on the effects of small business lending
activity on each variable, were also conducted. Since the results were consistent with the
multivariate analyses, they are not reported to conserve space.
15. It is not possible to further infer that increasing equity capital causes an increase in profits,
which is beyond the scope of the present paper. As discussed earlier, the capital ratio is 
included in the regression model to account for cross-sectional differences among banks that
possibly affect their operating decisions, including small business lending.
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